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STUDENT COMMENTS
SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT: THE PRIVATE
PLAINTIFF'S REMEDIES
The right of a private party, who is injured in his business or property
by reason of a violation of federal antitrust law, to sue for treble damages is
as old as federal antitrust law itself. The private antitrust action was created
in 1890 as part of the Sherman Antitrust Act.' When the Clayton Act of 1914
expanded the scope of the proscribed activity, authority to maintain a private
action for damages was similarly expanded to cover violations of the new
law.2
 Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits corporate acquisition of stock
or assets of another corporation where the effect of such acquisition may be
to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line
of commerce in any section of the country.' Under the clear language of the
Clayton Act, a violation of section 7 which causes injury should create in the
injured party a right to sue for treble damages. Yet courts have, for the most
part, refused to adopt this syllogism and the clear mandate of section 4. We
shall attempt to analyze the reasons for this refusal, and perhaps suggest a
way out of this court-created quandary.
I. THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides simply:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor
in any district court of the United States in the district in which
the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect
to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the dam-
ages by him sustained, and the cost of the suit, including a reason-
able attorney's fee .4
The Clayton Act is, by its own definition, an "antitrust law"; 15
 thus a person
injured by any activity which is forbidden by the Clayton Act is authorized
by section 4 to sue for treble damages. In addition, Section 16 of the Clayton
Act specifically authorizes injunctive relief against damage resulting from
a section 7 violation:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled
to sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United
States having jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened loss
1
 Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647,
	 7, 26 Stat. 210.
2
 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. 	 15 (1964). In 1955, the Sherman Act treble
damage provision was repealed, having been superseded by the Clayton Act provision.
Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 283, 3, 69 Stat. 28L
a 38 Stat.' 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
4 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
5 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C.
	 12 (1964).
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or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws, including sections 13,
14, 18, and 19 of this title . . . .°
The burden of the section 7 plaintiff, as well as that of all other private
antitrust plaintiffs,7 is further lightened by Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act,
which provides:
A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any
civil or criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United
States under the antitrust laws shall be prima facie evidence against
such defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any other
party against such defendant under said laws ... , as to all matters
respecting which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as
between the parties thereto... 8
The difficulty arises, however, when it is sought to apply these remedial
statutes to Section 7 of the Clayton Act. As amended in 1950, the statute
was designed to supplement the antimonopoly provisions of the Sherman
Act by arresting restraints on trade in their incipiency and prohibiting from
the outset those combinations which are likely to result in full-fledged Sherman
Act violations.° Section 7 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or
indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital
and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of
another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line
of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisi-
tion may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create
a monopoly. (Emphasis supplied. )10
Congress, however, left to the Federal Trade Commission and the courts the
difficult task of devising workable standards for determining whether a par-
6 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1964). Section 18 "of this title" is § 7 of the
Clayton Act,
7 The other violations for which private relief is authorized are combinations or
conspiracies in restraint of trade, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964); monopolies
and attempts, combinations or conspiracies to monopolize, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C.
§ 2 (1964); price discriminations and related offenses, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C.
§ 13 (1964); exclusive dealing contracts, 49 Stat. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964);
tying arrangements, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964); and interlocking
directorates, 49 Stat. 717 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1964).
8 69 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964). However, judgments not on the
merits—consent judgments or decrees entered before any testimony has been taken—
cannot be used as prima facie evidence in private actions. Ibid.
This section saves the private litigant the costly piocess of assembling the complex
data usually required to prove a § 7 violation if the Government has already done
so. Besides facilitating recovery by all private parties injured by antitrust violations,
the section encourages suits by those who - would not otherwise seek recovery because
of inability to maintain a proceeding so cumbersome as one requiring proof ab initio of a
§ 7 violation
9 For the legislative history of the amendment, see Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton
Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 226, 233-38 (1960).
10 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 	 18 (1964).
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ticular merger has the prohibited effects on competition. Their problems in
formulating such standards and the soundness of their attempts, particularly
from an economic point of view, have been widely discussed." But private
litigants encounter the most difficulty from the provision that has given the
courts the least pause—the "may be" test.
Section 7 condemns acts which have a "reasonable tendency to result
in violations of the Sherman Act." 12 It was directed at neither the bare pos-
sibility that anticompetitive effects might occur, nor the accomplished anti-
competitive acts already covered by the Sherman Act. Thus the concept of
probability was a necessary element in the definition of the forbidden ac-
quisitions if the statute was to be effective in preventing those combinations
which experience had indicated usually led to monopoly."
The statute is concerned with the reasonable probability of the les-
sening of competition or tendency toward monopoly as a result of
the particular acquisition under scrutiny—a showing that such
effects are reasonably likely to occur. This is what the words "may
be" as used in the statute mean."
The indicia of a "reasonable probability" that competition will be im-
paired necessarily vary from case to case. In the typical horizontal merger--
one involving competitors in the same line of commerce—the fact that one
of the competitors has been eliminated makes it relatively simple to find the
probability that competition will be lessened. 15
 In a vertical merger, between
firms actually or potentially in a customer-supplier relationship, a firm's
acquisition of a customer forecloses competition for that customer's business,
and the probability of a substantial lessening of competition is thus estab-
lished. 16
 Where the parties to the merger are neither in a competitive nor
in a buyer-seller relationship, a conglomerate merger results; these have been
struck down on a variety of sometimes rather esoteric theories.
For example, the dangers of "reciprocity" were enunciated by the FTC
and the Supreme Court in FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp. 17
 Consolidated,
a diversified food processing and sales company, acquired Gentry, Inc., one
of two major producers of dehydrated onion and garlic. The Supreme Court
affirmed the FTC's determination that the acquisition violated section 7 be-
cause of Consolidated's ability to induce its suppliers to do business with
Gentry, thereby strengthening Gentry's already firm position in the dehy-
11 See, e.g., Bok, supra note 9; Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1313 (1965); Recent Developments in Antitrust Law:
Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Demise of the Conglomerate Merger, 6 B.C. Ind.
& Corn. L. Rev. 254 (1964).
12 Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 221 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); see United
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 597 (1957).
13
 S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1950), cited in American Crystal Sugar
Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). •
14 United States v. Continental Can Co., 217 F. Supp. 761, 767 (S.D.N.Y. 1963),
rev'd on other grounds, 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
is See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co, v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
16 See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
17 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
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drated onion and garlic market." Such reciprocity in trading 19 points to the
probability of a lessening of competition "where, as here, the acquisition is
of a company that commands a substantial share of the market." 2° Although
in this case evidence was presented that Consolidated had in fact actively
solicited reciprocal arrangements in favor of Gentry, the Court adopted the
FTC's conclusion that
"merely as a result of its connection with Consolidated, and without
any action on the latter's part, Gentry would have an unfair advan-
tage over competitors enabling it to make sales that otherwise
might not have been made."21
Another approach, the "deep-pocket" theory, emerged in Reynolds
Metals Co. v. FTC." Reynolds, a producer of aluminum foil, acquired Arrow
Brands, Inc., which converted and decorated foil for resale to florists, enjoying
about a third of the florist foil market. Although the court could have applied
the principles relevant to vertical mergers, it chose instead to invalidate the
acquisition on the theory that the financial backing of Reynolds gave Arrow
a decisive advantage over its competitors.
Arrow's assimilation into Reynolds' enormous capital structure and
resources gave Arrow an immediate advantage over its competitors.
. . . The power of the "deep pocket" or "rich parent" . . . might
enable Arrow to sell at prices approximating cost or below and thus
to undercut and ravage the less affluent competition. (Emphasis
supplied.) 23
As in Consolidated, the court emphasized that the FTC was not required to
show the occurrence of actual anticompetitive practices. To bring the acquisi-
tion within the prohibitions of section 7, it is sufficient that the acquisition
"had the capacity or potentiality" to lessen competition. 24
Moreover, it is not even necessary to a section 7 violation that either
or both of the merged parties have been previously engaged in the affected
line of commerce. In United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,25 the Supreme
Court held that a conglomerate merger violated section 7 because it eliminated
potential competition. El Paso, which sold half of all gas used in California,
18 The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which had
held that the FTC had failed to show a probability that the acquisition would sub-
stantially lessen competition. Consolidated Foods Corp. v. FTC, 329 F.2d 623 (7th Cir.
1964).
19 "Reciprocal trading may ensue not from bludgeoning or coercion but from more
subtle arrangements. A threatened withdrawal of orders if products of an affiliate cease
being bought, or a conditioning of future purchases on the receipt of orders for products
of that affiliate, is an anticompetitive practice." FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp.,
supra note 17, at 1222.
20 Id. at 1225.
21 Id. at 1223.
22
 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
23 Id. at 230.
24
 Ibid.
25
 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
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acquired Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corporation, a large western gas com-
pany which did not sell in the California market, although it had unsuccess-
fully tried to do so in the past. The merger created a reasonable probability
that competition would be impaired, said the Court, because the California
market was expanding and Pacific Northwest, before the merger, had pos-
sessed the resources, managerial skill and proximity to the market to attempt
to enter the market on its own and was therefore a potential competitor
which the merger had eliminated.2°
United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co.27 extended the potential com-
petition rationale one step further. Pennsalt Chemicals Corporation and Olin
Mathieson Company joined to form Penn-Olin to make and sell sodium
chlorate in the southeastern United States. While in El Paso one of the parties
to the merger had been competing in the market in question, here neither
Pennsalt nor Olin had been a competitor in the relevant market. Both com-
panies, however, had had a continuing interest in entering the market sep-
arately and had the resources to do so. The Supreme Court found a section 7
violation in that the formation of Penn-Olin eliminated the possibility that
Pennsalt and Olin would ever enter the market separately. The Court felt
that the threat of these companies "waiting anxiously to enter an oligopo-
listic market would be a substantial incentive to competition which can-
not be underestimated."28
Thus, a finding that section 7 has been violated need not be predicated
on any demonstrable anticompetitive results: it may be based solely on an
educated guess29 that hypothetical harmful effects will probably materialize.
This distinguishes a section 7 violation from the other types of antitrust
violations for which private recovery is authorized: for section 7 is concerned
not with the actual, but with the probable; not with the present, but with the
future; not with market behavior which has produced injuries, but with
market structure which is likely to produce injuries. A conviction for price
discrimination necessarily implies the existence of someone who has been
discriminated against. A conviction for price fixing implies that someone was
forced to pay a higher price than he otherwise would have. But a conviction
for a section 7 violation does not necessarily imply the existence of any
injured party. It is this concept of probability inherent in section 7's pre-
ventive purpose that has precluded the majority of the concerned courts
from reconciling section 7 with section 4, the treble damage section.
28 Id. at 658-62.
27 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
28 Id. at 174. A bird in the hand, it seems, is not worth two in the bush. The
Court prefers two potential competitors to one actual competitor, and is left with the
curious finding that the entry of an additional competitor will probably lessen com-
petition.
29 A	 7 determination requires "a predictive economic judgment, a conclusion as
to the probability of various possible economic consequences of a merger, and an
assessment of the substantiality of those effects. Except in the most obvious cases,
economic theory simply does not permit confident judgments on these issues even when
all the economically relevant facts have been duly assembled." Turner, supra note 11, at
1318.
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II. ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN TREBLE DAMAGES FOR SECTION 7 VIOLATIONS
Three elements must be alleged and proved in private antitrust treble
damage actions: (1) Violation by defendant of an antitrust law, (2) an as-
certainable injury to the plaintiff's business or property which is reducible
to money damages, and (3) a causal connection between the violation and
the injury 30
 It is under this third element that the logical difficulties of
section 7 have arisen.
The strict application of the requirement that the plaintiff's damage be
the result of the violation itself led, in Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 31
not only to a denial of recovery but also to the denial of the possibility of
recovery for damages as a result of a section 7 violation. In 1957 the Supreme
Court had found a section 7 violation in the purchase of General Motors
(GM) stock by the Du Pont Company. The rationale was that Du Pont had
achieved its position as GM's supplier of automotive finishes and fabrics
because Du Pont's purchase of GM stock and the consequent intercompany
relationship had insulated the GM market from free competition and created
a likelihood of monopoly. 32 Relying on that decision, the plaintiffs, minority
shareholders of GM, brought a derivative action for damages allegedly
sustained as a result of the acquisition.
After restating the predictive nature of section 7, the Gottesman court
denied recovery, declaring that "plaintiffs cannot be damaged by a potential
restraint of trade or monopolization. There can be no claim for money
damages for a violation of section 7."33 Although there may have been a loss
ultimately traceable to the acquisition, the court could find no causal relation-
ship between the loss and the evil against which section 7 was directed—
potential lessening of competition.
The same result was reached on similar grounds in Bailey's Bakery,
Ltd. v. Continental Baking Co. 34 Bailey was in competition with a bakery
which Continental acquired. Alleging that the acquisition violated section 7,
Bailey asserted that he was no longer able to compete with the acquired
bakery because of the extensive advertising and price cutting it had under-
taken since its merger with Continental, and sued for treble damages. The
court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint as to the
section 7 charges for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
holding that no private action accrues from a section 7 violation.33
The court characterized section 7 as "strictly an 'ounce of prevention'
Act, based on a 'may be' monopoly situation." 3° Because of the statute's
concern with the future tendencies of an acquisition,
any damages claimed for future restraint of trade would be purely
speculative, and a plaintiff cannot recover money damages for antici-
40
 Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 289 F.2d 86, 90 (9th
Cir. 1961).
31 Supra note 12.
32
 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., supra note 16, passim.
83 Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., supra note 12, at 493.
84 235 F. Supp. 705 (D. Hawaii 1964).
35
 Id. at 717.
33 Id. at 716.
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pated but unimplemented acts of restraint which may invade its
interests."
In this case, however, Bailey alleged not a future but a present restraint
of trade. He alleged an injury resulting from exactly what section 7 was
intended to prevent: a lessening of competition as the result of a corporate
acquisition. Yet the court denied that section 7 provided relief. The purpose
of the statute, said the court, was to supplement the Sherman Act; it was
"intended primarily to arrest apprehended relationships before those relation-
ships could work their evil," 38 but it was not intended to cover anticom-
petitive practices occurring after, even if as a result of, the merger in question.
The prohibitory sanctions of Clayton § 7 are triggered to explode
by and at the moment of acquisition. That, after the moment of
acquisition, subsequent practices do injure competitors in the market
does not, because of those subsequent injurious acts, give rise to a
claim for treble damages under Clayton § 7. 38
The court thus felt that the statute protects competition by protecting
that relationship of companies known as a competitive market, and not
by condemning specific anticompetitive acts. Accordingly, section 7 operates
only at the moment of acquisition and does not encompass any subsequent
activity even if that activity happens to be anticompetitive." Clearly, under
this view, no private recovery is possible, for private plaintiffs are not injured
by the very act of the merger itself; they are injured by some act which
results from or is made possible by the merger.
In Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc.,'" however, the District Court
for the Southern District of New York refused to accept the Bailey rationale.
Ames, whose business was the distribution of fastening devices and equip-
ment, was a distributor for Calnail, Inc., which manufactured an industrial
nailing tool. Bostitch, the dominant producer of fastening equipment in the
national market, acquired Calnail. In the same agreement in which the
merger was consummated, Bostitch and Calnail agreed that Bostitch would
take over the distribution of Calnail products and that the pre-existing ar-
rangements for the distribution of Calnail products by Ames would be
cancelled.
" Id. at 717.
38
 Id. at 716.
89 Id. at 716-17.
49
 This approach, however, has been rejected in government prosecutions of § 7.
In United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., supra note 16, the merger was
already over 30 years old when the government action was commenced. The Court stated:
The appellees argue that the Government could not maintain this action
in 1949 because 7 is applicable only to the acquisition of stock and not to the
holding or subsequent use of the stock. This argument misconceives the objective
toward which § 7 is directed. The Clayton Act was designed to supplement the
Sherman Act. Its aim was primarily to arrest apprehended consequences of inter-
corporate relationships before those relationships could work their evil, which
may be at or at any time after the acquisition, depending upon the circumstances
of the particular case.
Id. at 596-97.
41
 240 E. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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Ames sued for treble damages, alleging that the merger of Bostitch
and Calnail violated section 7 and that he had suffered consequent damage
when his distributorship was terminated. 42 Bostitch conceded, for the pur-
pose of the motion only, that its acquisition of Calnail had violated section 7,
but sought to dismiss the treble damage action for failure to state a claim.
The court, although duly noting Bostitch's reliance on Gottesman and
Bailey for their holdings that no private action can accrue from a section
7 violation, nevertheless thought the present situation distinguishable. Here
the court saw a more direct relationship between the loss and the merger:
Plaintiffs have lost their distributorships. They lost them, according
to the complaint, substantially at the moment when defendant ac-
quired Calnail. Since . . . the acquisition of Calnail was illegal,
defendant's illegal act has caused plaintiffs immediate and present
damage. I cannot escape the conclusion that plaintiffs are entitled to
recover that damage. 43
In denying defendant's motion for dismissal,'" the court found signifi-
cance in the fact that Congress made no exception for section 7 when it
authorized private recovery for injuries resulting from "anything forbidden
in the antitrust laws," 45 but it obviously imparted more significance to the
fact that the loss to the plaintiff occurred "at the moment" of the acquisition;
that is, the loss of the distributorship and the acquisition both resulted from
the same agreement.
The soundness of the Ames decision was commented upon by the court
which has most recently spoken on the subject of private relief under section
7, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.
In Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co.," plaintiff alleged injuries
resulting from the merger previously considered in Reynolds Metals Co. v.
FTC; 47 plaintiff was one of Arrows' competitors in the florist foil market.
The district court held's that the claim was barred by the four-year statute
of limitations, which, the court said, was not suspended by the FTC pro-
ceeding against Reynolds in 1957. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed this holding's and included, in dictum, its opinion of private rights
of action under section 7. In light of the circuit court's ruling, the section
7 claim was dismissed."
42
 Ames also alleged a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act in that Bostitch conspired
with Calnail to refuse to deal with plaintiffs and other former Calnail distributors. Id.
at 523.
43 Id. at 524.
44 Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the Sherman Act charge was also
denied. Id. at 529. While refusing to dismiss the § 7 claim, the court did not guarantee
its success. "Whether plaintiffs can prove .. . damages, or, for that matter, whether
they can prove a violation, is, of course, something with which we are not concerned
upon the present motion." Id. at 526.
45
 Id. at 524
45
 245 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Mo. 1965).
47 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
48 Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 F. Supp. 15 (E.D. Mo. 1963).
49
 Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 327 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1964).
50
 238 F. Supp. 561 (E.D. Mo. 1965).
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The present action was a motion by plaintiff for reconsideration of that
dismissal in view of the Supreme Court's subsequent ruling that FTC pro-
ceedings do serve to suspend the running of the statute of limitations."
Reynolds opposed the motion, denying the possibility of private relief
under section 7 and emphasizing the following dicta in the Eighth Circuit's
previous opinion:
We think that any effort to convert Section 7 of the Clayton Act
into a per se violation of the anti-trust laws so as to give rise to a
private right of action under the Clayton Act has been squarely
checked by what is said by Mr. Chief Justice Warren in Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 82 S. Ct. 1502, 8 L. Ed. 2d 510.
As interpreted in that case, Section 7 of the Clayton Act does not
condemn all mergers, but only those having demonstrable anti-com-
petitive effects. The statute deals with clear-cut menaces to competi-
tion, not with accomplished monopolies, presently creating damage
to a competitor, which is the sine qua non of a private right of action
under Section 5 (sic) of the Clayton Act.52
The court recognized that the Minnesota Mining decision overturned
the Eighth Circuit's ruling on the statute of limitations, but expressed no
dissatisfaction with the Eighth Circuit's position on the possibility of private
relief.
Absent a controlling Supreme Court ruling, this Court is required to
give great weight to the pronouncements of our Court of Appeals,
even though they appear by way of dictum. 53
The problem of causation was again examined" and the language of the
Bailey case exempting post-merger activity from the coverage of section 7
was cited. This "grudging application of the requirement of causation," 55
the court notes, was not followed in Ames v. Bostitch, but the Ames rationale
is criticized. Furthermore, the circuit court's view of the causation issue must
control. "It has chosen to apply a narrow concept of causation and this
Court must defer thereto.""
With one exception, then, the courts have found a logical inconsistency
in the statutory scheme, and have carved out a judicial exception to the all-
inclusive language of Section 4 of the Clayton Act.
III. THE MAJORITY APPROACH
The "no recovery" approach of the Gottesman, Bailey and Highland
courts, though no doubt motivated by an honest attempt to deal with the
logical dilemmas of section 7, is nonetheless an undesirable solution in light
51
 Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311
(1965).
52
 Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., supra note 49.
55
 Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metal Co., supra note 46, at 512.
64
 "The problem arises because a plaintiff cannot allege that he has been injured
solely by a merger or acquisition which has potential prohibited effects." Id. at 512-13.
55
 Id. at 513.
58
 Id. at 514.
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of the purpose of section 4. Clearly, section 4 represented an attempt by
Congress to facilitate enforcement of the antitrust laws by making it worth-
while for the private plaintiff to prosecute antitrust violations which might
otherwise escape detection." The intent of section 7 is to prevent or arrest
those concentrations of capital which are likely to decrease the vitality of
the competitive market. This danger is as inherently inimical to competition
as any other antitrust violation. Concurrent enforcement of section 7 by
private parties is therefore as desirable and necessary as it is to the admin-
istration of any other antitrust law. Courts should not draw a line at section
7 and refuse to allow concurrent enforcement of that one law alone unless
it is absolutely unavoidable to do so.
Is the logical difficulty so great as to necessitate a complete foreclosure
of recovery, or has the line been unnecessarily drawn? The answer is indicated
by an examination of the importance of the problem in other antitrust
areas, the presence or absence of similar difficulties in granting injunctive
relief under section 7, and the use of post-acquisition evidence to prove a
section 7 violation.
A. Private Relief in Other Antitrust Areas
An antitrust plaintiff must prove that his injury resulted from some-
thing prohibited in the antitrust laws. Section 7, so the argument goes, con-
demns only mergers of a certain type; it does not forbid post-merger anti-
competitive acts even though those acts result from or are made possible
by the merger. Since the merger itself, which is the only thing the statute
prohibits, can cause no present damage, treble damages cannot be awarded
for a section 7 violation.
But the fact is, of course, that the strict causation requirement which has
been applied to section 7 has not been applied to other antitrust areas, and the
possibility of private relief in those areas is not questioned on logical
grounds. For example, in Atlantic Heel Co. v. Allied Heel Co.," specific
anticompetitive acts (wrongful taking of trade secrets, false statements con-
cerning plaintiff's financial condition, attempts to recruit plaintiff's key
employees, interference with plaintiff's suppliers), even though not pro-
hibited in Section 1 of the Sherman Act pertaining to conspiracies in restraint
of trade, were the basis for private relief for violation of that section.
A better example of the judicial approach to the "causation" problem is
57
 "The grant of a claim for treble damages to persons injured was for the purpose
of multiplying the agencies which would help enforce the antitrust laws and therefore
make them more effective." Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 214 F.2d
891, 893 (5th Cir. 1954). This purpose is facilitated by a four-year statute of limitations,
69 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1964), which is suspended while a government
prosecution against the same defendant is pending or in progress and for one year there-
after. 69 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964). The Supreme Court has recently
held that proceedings by the Federal Trade Commission as well as prosecution by the
Department of Justice serve to suspend the running of the statute of limitations. Minne-
sota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., supra note 51. See Rockefel-
ler, The Supreme Court and the Private Antitrust Plaintiff, 7 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev.
279 (1965).
58 284 F.2d 879 (1st Cir. 1960).
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Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co." In an earlier action, the Fourth Circuit had
found that Sinclair had agreed with Goodyear to assist, on a commission
basis, in selling Goodyear tires, batteries and accessories to Sinclair dealers;
and that Sinclair required its dealer-lessees in Maryland, one of whom was
Osborn, to buy Goodyear products as a condition of their leases." Osborn,
alleging that his dealership had been cancelled because he refused to co-
operate in carrying Goodyear products, brought an action for treble damages
based on a violation of Section 3 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits tying
arrangements.
The district court applied the same rationale as the Gottesman, Bailey,
and Highland courts have applied to a section 7 action. The court recog-
nized the illegality of the tying arrangement and found that Sinclair's
termination of Osborn's lease was in furtherance of that arrangement, but
denied that the termination could be the basis for damages because it was
not a "per se" violation of the antitrust laws. 61
Although the tying arrangement may be illegal per se, and give rise
to criminal or civil action by the government or to private claims for
damages ... , the termination of a dealership in furtherance of such
a plan or arrangement is not per se a violation of the antitrust laws;
such a termination will not give rise to a claim for treble damages
unless it amounts to an unreasonable restraint of trade."
The district court's denial of relief on the grounds that the termination
was an act not prohibited by the antitrust laws was rejected by the Fourth
Circuit as inconsistent with the language and purpose of section 4. The
lower court's position, said the court of appeals, "is in direct conflict with
the statutorily declared right to treble damages for injury to one's business
caused by a violation of the antitrust laws." 63 The purpose of the treble
damage provision is concurrent enforcement of the antitrust laws, but the
lower court's limitation on section 4 "would in large measure frustrate this
salutary purpose."'" In many, if not most, antitrust actions, says the court,
the damage alleged is loss of profits through refusal to deal, and if a seller
can implement illegal tying arrangements by refusing to deal without having
to answer for damages, the effectiveness of section 4 as an enforcement
measure would be greatly diminished.65
The court did not feel compelled to deal at length with the causation
argument. Osborn lost his dealership because he refused to cooperate with
the illegal arrangement; his injury was therefore undeniably " 'by reason of
something forbidden in the antitrust laws.""
There appears to be no reason why section 7 should be treated any
59 324 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963).
60 Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960), cert denied, 366
U.S. 963 (1961).
61 Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 207 F. Supp. 856, 861 (D. Md. 1962).
09 Ibid.
63 Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., supra note 59, at .571
64 Id. at 572.
65 Ibid.
69 Id. at 571.
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differently. Why should courts feel more constrained to compensate those
damaged as the result of an illegal merger than those whose injury was the
result of a prohibited tying arrangement? Tying agreements, in the abstract,
are as harmless as illegal mergers; it is only when the tying agreement or the
merger is consummated and the effect on the competitive market appears
that the undesired evils occur. It was to prevent the occurrence of these
evils that Congress decided to prevent the formation of their causes. And
it was to compensate those who are injured by virtue of the evils that tying
agreements and illegal mergers spawn that the Congress passed section 4.
B. Injunctive Relief
Section 16 of the Clayton Act specifically names section 7 as one of the
antitrust laws whose violation will be the basis for granting injunctive relief
if loss or damage is threatened. Despite the narrow view of causation taken
by the courts in private treble damage suits based on section 7 violations,
courts have not felt bound to apply a similarly strict standard to suits for
injunctive relief, and pre- or post-acquisition activity has been enjoined.
Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co." is an illustration. Benrus
bought 24% of Hamilton's outstanding stock as part of a plan to gain control
of Hamilton. Hamilton alleged a section 7 violation and sought a preliminary
injunction to prevent Benrus from voting its stock at the Hamilton share-
holders' meeting. The court found a violation because the acquisition was
part of a plan to gain control of Hamilton, which plan was reasonably
probable to succeed, and, if successful, would probably substantially lessen
competition. Benrus was enjoined from voting its newly-acquired stock.
The threatened damage which Hamilton successfully alleged was the prob-
ability that Benrus would vote its stock to gain representation on Hamilton's
board of directors and use its representation to "persuade or to compel a
relaxation of the full vigor of Hamilton's competitive effort... ."68
Note, of course, that the damage alleged by Hamilton, even had it
already been accomplished, would not meet the treble-damage causation
requirement, for the damage would have resulted not from the acquisition
itself, but from voting the stock to gain representation to induce a lessening
of competition—all of which are post-acquisition acts.
The Second Circuit affirmed," citing the need for prompt action to
prevent anticompetitive practices once the plaintiff satisfies the court that
section 7 has been violated. "Interference at an early stage, if possible, seems
the paramount aim."" "[T]he private harm to plaintiff required as a con-
dition of granting injunctive relief under Section 16 need not be at all the
same as the public harm condemned by Section 7."71
Other cases have followed a similar pattern. In American Crystal Sugar
Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co.," plaintiff successfully sought to enjoin
67 114 F. Supp. 307 (D. Conn. 1953).
°8 Id. at 317.
00
 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953).
7° Id. at 742
71 Id. at 743
72
 152 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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defendant from voting his newly-acquired stock in plaintiff's company. A sec-
tion 7 violation was found on the same grounds as in Hamilton, but here
plaintiff alleged additional threatened damage. If the acquisition of plaintiff's
stock by defendant continued and a merger resulted which violated the anti-
trust laws, prosecution, plaintiff asserted, might well result in loss and expense
to him. Furthermore, claimed the plaintiff, if defendant gained representation
on plaintiff's board of directors, a damaging disclosure of the plaintiff's
future business plans would result.
Plaintiffs in these cases were parties to the acquisition, seeking to enjoin
their own absorption through a merger made possible by the acquisition.
Injunctive relief has been granted, perhaps largely because of the great
damage which would be suffered by the plaintiff and the market should the
merger take place and later be dissolved by a section 7 divestiture order.
Competition is not protected if one of the parties to a condemned merger
cannot reactivate itself as a competitive entity because it has lost its customers
and trade secrets.
In suits for injunctive relief under section 7, then, courts seem to have
taken the position that post-acquisition acts which are of the type the statute
is generally aimed at preventing are enjoinable, even though they are not
specifically prohibited in the statute, and have thus not equated standing
to sue for treble damages with standing to sue for injunctive relief. This
disparity in treatment may not be unreasonable. Section 4 authorizes treble
damages for injury "by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws,"
while section 16 authorizes injunctive relief "against threatened loss or
damage by a violation of the antitrust laws." The difference in wording of
the two statutes arguably permits a greater range of acts to be enjoined than
may be the basis for treble damages, because it may, in reality, be easier to
show the threat of harm than the reality of harm. But perhaps a more signifi-
cant reason is that the nature of injunctive relief is more akin to the
statutory scheme of section 7. While a court may be naturally reluctant to
award treble damages based on violation of a statute which implies no
present injury, similar compunctions might not be felt about granting in-
junctive relief, where the natures both of the statute and of the relief sought
are preventive. And while in a suit for damages an ascertainable monetary
loss is essential, injunctive relief is intended to function when no present
damages are ascertainable.
But despite the differences between injunctive relief and treble damages,
the fact that courts have applied a less strict causation requirement when
dealing with injunctive relief may shed some light upon the validity of the
strict causation requirement applied in treble damage actions. Why should a
plaintiff be under a lesser duty to connect the injury with the prohibitions
of the statute when the relief he seeks—prevention or divestiture of the
merger—is even more drastic than treble damages? And why should he be
able to employ section 7 to enjoin post-acquisition acts, yet be denied recovery
should he be injured by the very same acts, on the ground that section 7 does
not prohibit these acts? These questions deserve some judicial consideration
before section 7 treble damage relief is foreclosed entirely.
345
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
C. Post-Acquisition Evidence
Another reason against denying treble damages for post-acquisition acts
is based on the Government's ability to use evidence of such acts to prove
a section 7 violation. In Consolidated Foods, for example, the FTC pre-
sented evidence that the defendant had in fact attempted to solicit reciprocal
agreements. The violation was based not on those agreements alone, but on
the probability that Consolidated would increase its efforts in that direction
and thereby seriously impede competition. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court,
although emphasizing that section 7 requires only the probability of anti-
competitive effects,73
 still approved the use as evidence of actual post-acqui-
sition effects.
The Court of Appeals was not in error in considering the post-
acquisition evidence in this case. . . . If the post-acquisition evi-
dence were given conclusive weight or was allowed to override all
probabilities, then acquisitions would go forward willy-nilly, the
parties biding their time until reciprocity was allowed fully to
bloom. It is, of course, true that post-acquisition conduct may
amount to a violation of § 7 even though there is no evidence to
establish probability in limine.74
Is it not, then, inconsistent to allow the Government to help prove a
violation by pointing to a particular anticompetitive act as the kind of prac-
tice section 7 was intended to prevent, but at the same time deny that section
4—whose purpose is to provide supplementary enforcement of the anti-
trust laws—authorizes the awarding of treble damages to a person injured
by those same acts? This is not to say that post-acquisition anticompetitive
acts must necessarily be proven in a prior government action before a
private plaintiff may recover. Rather, the use of such evidence indicates
that the anticompetitive effects themselves, and not the merger per se, are
the evils against which section 7 is aimed, and those for which section 4
recovery should be allowed.
Perhaps even more significantly, the use of such evidence should allay
judicial misgivings about relaxing the strict causation requirement lest
damages be awarded for harm which did not result essentially from the
78 FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., supra note 17, at 1224:
But the force of	 7 is still in probabilities, not in what later transpired.
That must necessarily be the case, for once the two companies are united no-
one knows what the fate of the acquired company and its competitors would
have been but for the merger.
74
 Ibid. Mr. Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion, offered a defense for the
use of post-acquisition evidence.
To determine that probability [that competition will be lessened', the
courts and the Commissions should rely on the best information available,
whether it is an examination of the market structure before the merger has
taken place, or facts concerning the changes in the market after the merger has
been consummated. For that reason, I differ with the Court in its assessment
of the weight to be accorded post-acquisition evidence. That evidence is the
best evidence available to determine whether the merger will distort market
forces in the . . industry.
Id. at 1228.
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merger. If a federal court hearing a government suit is qualified to decide
which post-acquisition acts were caused by the merger and therefore ad-
missible to help prove the violation, the same court would seem to be
equally qualified to decide which acts were caused by the merger and there-
fore grounds for treble damage actions.
IV. THE AMES APPROACH
The foregoing discussion points up the undesirability and needlessness of
completely denying the possibility of relief. The Ames decision admits the
possibility of relief and, for that reason alone, has a great deal to recommend
it. But while the Ames court does not deny relief, neither does it realistically
limit it.
According to Ames, the plaintiff could recover because he lost his dis-
tributorship "substantially at the same time" as the consummation of the
merger. This reliance on the simultaneity of the violation and the loss
clearly creates a false issue, for the test is one of causation, not one of
temporal proximity. The Highland court, recognizing this shortcoming of
Ames, expressed the fear that the granting of relief for injury due to any
act made possible by a violation of section 7 would create a limitless flow of
lawsuits.
Again, however, precedent in the other antitrust areas needs to be con-
sidered; the fear of the Highland court could have been allayed by a con-
sideration of the limitations embodied in the "target area" approach. This
is simply an elaboration of the traditional tort recovery requirement that the
plaintiff must be injured, not merely by some wrong resulting from the
violation of a statute, but by a wrong of the type the statute was designed to
prevent. For example, where the statute is one designed to preserve competi-
tion, the plaintiff
must show that he is within that area of the economy which is en-
dangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions in a particular
industry. Otherwise he is not injured "by reason" of anything for-
bidden in the antitrust laws. 75
In this way, the target area doctrine confines the windfall of treble
damages and denies standing to sue to those harmed only incidentally. 70
Accordingly, one whose loss results from diminution or interruption of a
profitable business relationship with a party directly affected by the violation,
where such diminution is merely incidental to the violation, may not recover.
The target area doctrine, then, merely represents the judicial interpretation
of Congress' expressed intent that the treble damage seeker must have incurred
his damages "by reason of" the antitrust violation.
The usefulness of these limitations can be exemplified by comparing
Ames with the case of Robinson v. Stanley Home Prods., Inc." In the latter
case, the plaintiff sold Plura Plastics' products (plastic cups) on commission.
75 Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951).
70 See Timberlake, The Legal Injury Requirements and Proof of Damages in Treble
Damage Actions Under the Antitrust Laws, 30 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 231, 236 (1961).
77 178 F. Supp. 230 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 272 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1959).
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After plaintiff had obtained orders for Plura's products from Stanley, Plura
and Stanley began dealing directly with each other and Plura terminated its
agreement with plaintiff. In a suit for three times the amount of commission
he lost on those direct sales, plaintiff alleged a violation of the Robinson-
Patrnan Act,78
 which prohibits price discriminations, alleging that Plura was
selling to Stanley at reduced prices which discriminated against Plura's other
customers.
The court denied recovery, holding that no relationship of proximate
cause existed between the price discrimination and plaintiff's loss of com-
mission. If plaintiff had suffered a wrong he would have to seek his remedy
by an action for breach of contract or wrongful interference with a con-
tractual relationship," but he could not recover treble damages merely be-
cause the harm happened to be preceded by an antitrust violation.
When this decision is compared with the Ames case, it becomes ap-
parent that the Ames court, while it alone admitted the possibility of treble
damage relief under section 7, probably went too far. The injury upon which
Ames predicated his claim was the loss of his distributorship, which he
claimed was a result of the merger between his former employer and Bostitch.
Even though a causal relationship between the merger and the termination
of Ames' distributorship might be shown, it seems clear that Ames was not
within the target area of section 7. His loss did not result from a lessening
of competition. In fact, his loss had no connection whatever with the legality
of the merger, for his distributorship might have been terminated as the result
of a perfectly legal merger. Ames, like Robinson, may have a remedy some-
where, but his recovery should not be tripled because his loss was preceded
by an antitrust violation.
By way of contrast; the plaintiff in Osborn v. Sinclair" was within the
target area of the anti-tying arrangement statute. Not only did he lose his
lease as the direct and proximate cause of the tying arrangement (i.e., be-
cause of his failure to acquiesce in the arrangement), but also, since he was
the intended victim of a tying arrangement, he was the sort of person the
statute was intended to protect.
V. CONCLUSION
While denial of recovery on logical grounds needlessly eviscerates the
enforcement provisions of section 4, the severity of the treble damage remedy
and the unfairness of undeserved windfalls require that this remedy be
limited to those within the target area of section 7. Since the target area of
section 7 is competition, standing to sue should probably be limited to those
competing in the market affected by the acquisition. Only a competitor can
be injured as a direct result of violation of a statute intended to prevent
the lessening of competition. Although post-violation activity can admittedly
injure noncompetitors, as in the Ames case, such injury is at best incidental
to the fact of a section 7 violation.
78 49 Stat. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C.	 13(a) (1964).
79
 Robinson v. Stanley Home Prods., Inc., 178 F. Sapp. 230, 233 (D. Mass.), aff'd,
272 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1959).
80 Supra note 59.
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Thus a competitor who is injured" by anticompetitive acts which result
from a section 7 violation ought to recover treble damages. There is no
logical difficulty in allowing private recovery under a statute which predicts
harm if, in fact, the predicted harm has already become a reality. Relief in
such cases can be granted by applying the same standards as are operative
in other private antitrust actions and should be granted in the interests of
a realistic compliance with the statutory scheme of antitrust law enforce-
ment.
JAMES H. WATZ
81
 The Supreme Court has stated that in private antitrust actions, damages may be
awarded based on a just and reasonable estimate. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc.,
327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946).
In 7 actions, such an estimate can be made by employing the same techniques used
in other antitrust areas. For example, Timberlake lists three basic ways to measure loss
of profits: (1) The "before and after" method, which compares profits preceding and
following the violations; (2) the "yardstick" method, which compares the plaintiff's
profits with those of a competitor; and (3) expert testimony, most commonly used in
connection with one of the first two methods. Timberlake, supra note 76, at 261-77.
349
